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1. Robert Venturi, Structure of Benjamin Franklin's House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, prove to be helpful, at least in characterizing some particular aspects of architecture and its relation to other arts.
To assess Goodman's views on architecture, it is important to recall the structure of Languages of Art; in particular, it is useful to remember that its main theses are presented as the respective answers to two questions that, as he himself admits, are relatively banal and only loosely linked together.
The first question, which concerns representation in art, can be formulated in the following manner: In what sense does art represent nature, and if -as Goodman holds -it is not by imitation, how can we speak of a connection between art and the world to which it refers? This question leads him to define the proper place of representation among the various other symbolization modes actualized by painting and other arts. The second question, which concerns the authenticity of works of art, might be phrased as follows: Does it make sense for an art lover who would acknowledge his inability to distinguish between an original painting and its hypothetically perfect copy, but who knows that one of them is a forgery, to claim on a strictly aesthetic level that the forgery is less valuable than the original? This question leads him to seek differential criteria of authenticity for works of art depending on whether they belong to painting, music, or, eventually, architecture, and hence to discuss problems concerning their very identity. Goodman devotes the first two chapters of Languages of Art to the first question and a large part of the following three chapters to the second. In the sixth and final chapter, he shows that the ideas he has set forth in response to these questions clarify one another by constituting -and this is apparently the goal of the whole book -a basis for a theory of symbolic systems applicable to the analysis of aesthetic experience. I propose to examine Goodman's answers to each of these questions insofar as they bear on architecture, starting with the second, which, in contrast to the first, can be discussed before an analysis of his theory of symbolization as such.
The Identity and Authenticity of Works of Architecture
To the proposition that two physically indistinguishable paintings (an authentic one and a forgery that would be a perfect copy of it) cannot, on a strictly aesthetic level, be considered of equal value, Goodman responds that such a claim is legitimate. He bases his assertion on an interesting discussion whose conclusions alone will be reported here.
For Goodman, the very notion of a painting's authenticity involved in this question presumes that the painting's own identity cannot be determined without reference to the historical conditions of its production. It is, indeed, to the historical conditions of the original painting's production that we refer when we maintain that the very fact that it was executed by the hand of a great master of the past excludes the possibility of considering as the same work a copy executed by a forger, as perfect as it might be. Were we to abstain from taking into consideration such historical conditions, we would be forced to conclude that the two paintings, exactly similar in all other regards, are two versions of the same work of art and that the problem of the authenticity of the so-called copy does not arise. For this reason, Goodman proposes the term autographic for those works of art, such as paintings, whose "most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine," as opposed to allographic works of art, such as musical compositions, whose quite various renditions can be considered equally "authentic."2 Naturally, that new renditions of musical works are not forgeries does not imply that these works fail to have their own identity. Thus Goodman claims that the identity of such allographic works is determined by their Lagueux examination of various arts to establish the extent to which they are autographic or allographic, Goodman concludes this review of the arts with three pages on the special case of architecture. At first glance, this art seems to be closer to painting than to music and we would consider it autographic in that a building is the materialization and the final step of a long (historical) process that started with the architect's initial sketches and that was oriented toward the erection of a singular building on a particular site. But, Goodman argues, considering that in a housing scheme, houses like, say, "Smith-Jones Split-Level #17" comply with an architect's plans, we must admit "that architecture has a reasonably appropriate notational system and that some of its works are unmistakably allographic."' Thus architecture is, in some sense, an allographic art like music. Goodman clearly betrays some hesitations on this ground, however; and, after observing that a copy of the Taj Mahal could hardly be characterized as an "instance of the same work," he acknowledges that "architecture is a mixed and transitional case." Without underestimating the importance of these nuances in Goodman's mind, it seems fair to say that his most original contention on this subject is that the architect's plans can define a work of architecture as a specific work, insofar as this work must comply with their requirements, much as the rendition of a musical work has to comply with those of a musical score.4
Let us expand a little further the discussion of the somewhat paradoxical aspect of the alleged allographic character of architectural works.5 Although it is entirely in accordance with current usage to consider different renditions of the same symphony (as long as the score is more or less followed) as instances of the same work just as much as the rendition directed by the composer himself, it is far more difficult to allow that a faithful copy of a work of architecture constitutes an instance of the work in question to the same degree as the work we feel obliged to term the "original." Certainly, a work of architecture shares with a work of music the property of not being, as a general rule, immediately executed by its creator. In this way, a work of architecture may be posthumous in a sense that can hardly be applied to pictorial work. The Grande Arche de la Defense, for example, is not considered an "unfinished" work, even though Johan Otto von Spreckelsen, its architect, died (having completed the essential plans) during the first stages of its construction. It is even true that the construction of a work can be postponed for a very long time, although not without causing certain theoretical problems that arise when classifying it among the works that together make up the architect's corpus. For example, it was by the end of the 1980s that the Essen Opera House, which Alvar Aalto (who died in 1976) had designed for the same site in the early 1960s, was constructed. This project had been canceled for financial reasons, but was revitalized and realized with the help of Aalto's firm more than a decade after its author's death. Now we can quite easily grant that we are dealing here with an authentic work by Aalto; but if such is the case, why could not any project or even any building come back to life after having been declared genuinely "dead"? In this manner, the famous Barcelona Pavilion built by Mies van der Rohe for the International Exposition of 1929, held in the city that gave it its name, was disassembled shortly afterwards -under conditions such that the materials from which it was constructed disappeared mysteriously -but was recently rebuilt on the site in accordance with its architect's plans using similar materials. Here we can state that the 1929 and 1989 pavilions, which are undoubtedly much more alike than are some interpretations of the same symphony, constitute two instances of the same work and can be identified allographically, even if, when faced with purists upset at not being able to admire Mies's own work, we might hesitate to assure them that these are equivalent instances of the same building. to which a building is dependent might be largely symbolic:
consider Egon Eiermann's Gedichtniskirche, whose modern structure adjoined to the ruins of the original Memorial Church on the Kurfiirstendamm has become one of Berlin's most striking architectural symbols. If we were to suppose that a wealthy admirer of this work had erected an exact copy of it somewhere in the New World, even allowing that the architect would have agreed to direct the construction of this "exact" copy, how could we speak of another instance of the same work when the copy has been stripped of all the potential meaning attached to the church in Berlin? As a limiting case, we might imagine the problem of copying the hollow structure that Robert Venturi erected on the site of Benjamin Franklin's house in Philadelphia, since this piece of architecture is nothing but a framed site, or better, nothing but its own symbolic context. Now, some works of music were conceived to be presented Representation, for Goodman, is simply one means of symbolization, and this is true even at a second degree: On the one hand, representation is but one mode of denotation among others, like verbal description, musical notation, and quotation. On the other hand, denotation itself is but one mode of symbolization (or reference) among others, like exemplification, expression, and chains of complex symbolization derived from them. Goodman holds that denotation occurs when a symbol of any kind is applied to an object or an event; for example, when, to characterize an animal, we use the word dog or draw a picture of a dog. By contrast, exemplification corresponds to the inversion (from the point of view of the referential direction) of an act of denotation: that which is denoted can refer to that which denotes it by exemplifying it. For example, a dog called Rex exemplifies the property that the word dog and our drawing aim to convey. Yet it is important to see that this distinction between these two referential directions is based on a fundamental asymmetry. Logically, denotation precedes exemplification and constitutes a necessary condition of it. But it is not the case that everything denoted exemplifies that which denotes it." Within the linguistic context in which the notion of denotation was invented, the basic idea is as follows: A predicate denotes a property belonging to various objects; because of this, any one of these objects can in principle exemplify the predicate that denotes one of its properties or, said more briefly, can exemplify this property.
Yet Goodman warns us that to exemplify, it is not sufficient for an object to have one of its properties denoted. Rather, this object must also refer explicitly to the predicate that de- clearly exemplify these properties. Here, this trick merely adds to the exemplification of a property actually possessed by the building. Yet, since it is a trick, it might equally have ex- to it by virtue of a type of intentional "category mistake" through which we attempt to expand the power of words. Here again my goal is less to challenge Goodman's analysis than to adapt it to the peculiarities of architecture. As he is primarily concerned with highlighting the complexity of symbolization, nothing prevents us from imagining that, besides denotation and exemplification, there are other ways to symbolize that he does not explicitly characterize in his discussion of aesthetic experience. In any case, Goodman clearly allows for such a possibility since he does not limit the modes of symbolization to those he applies to art. In- Naturally, we can object that most of such aesthetic symbolization can also be described with more natural language. Aesthetic experiences derived from trompe-l'oeil, like the experience provided by San Satiro, can be quite satisfactorily described by phenomenological or psychological means. But the point of a systematic approach like Goodman's is not to reveal for each of these modes of symbolization dimensions that cannot otherwise be perceived.
Rather, if Goodman's analysis is worth revisiting, it is because it offers a conceptual apparatus that permits us to compare symbolization as it works in various arts and even to relate aesthetic symbolization with other forms of reference occurring in other fields of experience.
When is Architecture?
It is true that Goodman, somewhat ambitiously, expects still more from his analysis. According to him, such a theory of symbolizing could considerably help to solve one of the most fundamental problems of aesthetics; namely, knowing what characterizes a work of art. While this question -which
Goodman has aptly reformulated as, when is art? _2-is hard to solve for any art, it seems even less answerable when considering functional arts like architecture. We cannot answer it simply by saying that architecture is identified with what professional architects build. Indeed, it may be possible for a respected architect to build functional buildings without aiming to "do architecture," whereas it is much more difficult to imagine that a professional painter could spend a lifetime applying color to a canvas without aiming to do painting. In such a context, it is difficult to determine which buildings executed by entrepreneurs and engineers from architects' plans are to be counted as works of architecture (or as works of art) and which should be considered as mere functional buildings without artistic pretensions. The answer that Goodman's analysis claims to vindicate relies on symbolism as the criterion of judgment: "a building is a work of art only insofar as it signifies, means, refers, symbolizes in some way."'4
At first glance, it seems indeed that the conceptual precision and coherence of Goodman's theoretical framework, which, in many regards, differentiates it from more literary approaches to symbolism, might constitute a helpful tool in distinguishing a true work of art from a purely functional object.
As promising as it may look, this approach will not do, nonetheless, without allowing for at least two problematic ambiguities, the first related to the asymmetrical structure of the various modes of symbolization and the second to the con-Lagueux nection between art and symbolism. In observing that very few buildings represent something, as we have seen,
Goodman concludes that architecturally significant buildings symbolize (or mean) through other modes, essentially derived from exemplification. But we have also seen that exemplification is based on an asymmetrical relationship and that it is not necessarily the case that everything denoted exemplifies that which denotes it. Goodman, however, sometimes seems to hesitate on this point. He states, for example, that monosyllabic words like short and long are denoted by the word short and that they are samples of this word that they exemplify.25 Yet to affirm this, we must take for granted that the second condition required for exemplification -namely, reference to a given property -is present here. But, in what sense might we claim that the short length of the words short and long actually refers to what is meant by the word short? Could these short words be considered so clearly symbols of shortness that we could correctly say that they exemplify this property? By considering that their very shortness is sufficient to qualify such words as samples of shortness, Goodman seems to suggest that possessing a quality (being denoted) is sufficient for exemplifying (being a sample).26 It is not in such a loose way that he uses the fabric sample to refer explicitly to the color yellow. It is a more restrained sense of the word exemplification that is illustrated by this example and it is only in this more restrained sense that exemplification is a fruitful concept for analyzing the type of symbolizing that characterizes art and architecture.27
So, to exemplify, that which is denoted must also refer to that which denotes it, and refer to it in a particular mode 27. Naturally, the point is not to deny that, in logical analysis, it might be highly convenient that a term like exemplification be available to designate a relation that is simply the opposite of denotation.
In this logical sense, anything denoted would exemplify that which denotes it, but it is not the case with the concept that Goodman applies to art after illustrating it with the fabric sample.
28. This point has been especially suggested to me by Jim
McGillivray.
29. Goodman, Reconceptions in Philosophy, 33.
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